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Diane Orentlicher* 
5.1. Introduction 
When my generation of international legal scholars came of age, efforts to 
research the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (‘IMTFE’) 
turned up remarkably few resources, at least in the English-language liter-
ature. Those we found invariably began by noting how little attention the 
Tribunal had received compared to the International Military Tribunal 
(‘IMT’) in Nuremberg.1 And when legal scholars did acknowledge the 
Tokyo Tribunal, they typically did so by adding “and Tokyo” to their re-
flections on Nuremberg’s legal legacy.2 Thus in the legal academy as in 
 
* Diane Orentlicher is Professor of Law at the Washington College of Law of American 
University. Professor Orentlicher, the author of Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact 
in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford University Press, 2018), has published and lectured exten-
sively in the fields of international criminal law and transitional justice. As the United Na-
tions Independent Expert on combating impunity, she updated the UN Set of principles for 
the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity (E/CN.4/
2005/102/Add.1). Professor Orentlicher served as Deputy for War Crimes Issues in the US 
Department of State from 2009 through 2011. Chase Dunn, Kara Kozikowski, and William 
Ryan provided invaluable research assistance for this chapter. 
1 This oft-noted point is captured in the title of a book by Arnold C. Brackman: The Other 
Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, William Morrow & Co., 
New York, 1987. See also R. John Pritchard, “The International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East and Its Contemporary Resonances: A General Preface to the Collection”, in R. 
John Pritchard (ed.), The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998, vol. 2, p. xxi, noting 
that scholars have studied the Tokyo trial proceedings “only rarely and even then, […] 
generally superficially” (‘Tokyo Trial Records’). While I have cited volume 2 here, 
Pritchard’s “General Preface” appears in each volume of this collection. 
2 See, for example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Nuremberg Forty Years After: An Introduction”, 
in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 1986, vol. 80, no. 2, pp. 61-64. 
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other disciplines, the Tokyo Tribunal was widely treated as “a sister insti-
tution, nothing more”.3 
In consequence, the Tribunal’s distinctive contributions to the field of in-
ternational criminal law were long obscured, with important exceptions to 
be sure. Writing as recently as 2010, one scholar noted that some experts 
in this field “completely overlook the IMTFE’s existence” or misstated 
key features of its operation and legacy.4 This is notable. After all, the Tri-
bunal played a foundational role in international criminal law, a field 
whose explosive growth in the early 1990s was one of the signal devel-
opments in international law in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
What, then, accounts for legal scholars’ relative neglect of the Tokyo Tri-
bunal? This chapter explores several key reasons, and then considers how 
the resulting gap in knowledge diminished the generally rich body of 
scholarship in the field of international criminal law. 
5.2. Accounting for Legal Scholars’ Relative Neglect 
One factor behind this general neglect is that the legal framework of the 
Tokyo Tribunal was derivative (though by no means a carbon copy) of the 
law of the IMT, as Section 5.3. elaborates. Accordingly, many saw the To-
kyo proceedings as “little more than an echo of the far more famous pro-
ceedings held at Nuremberg”.5 
Compounding this perception, the IMTFE concluded its work two 
years after the IMT issued its historic judgment. Recalling that the Nu-
remberg Trial “began quite soon after the end of the war, and it did not 
last very long”, a former judge on the IMTFE noted the obvious and im-
portant consequence: this timing substantially elevated global awareness 
of the IMT relative to the Tokyo Tribunal.6 At least among Western schol-
ars, then, it was natural to focus on Nuremberg when constructing narra-
tives of international law’s historic post-war shift to principles of individ-
ual responsibility for crimes under international law. 
 
3 Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and 
the Nuremberg legacy, Routledge, 2008, p. 9. 
4 Zachary D. Kaufman, “The Nuremberg Tribunal v. The Tokyo Tribunal: Designs, Staffs, 
and Operations”, in John Marshall Law Review, 2010, vol. 43, pp. 753-54. 
5 These words come from an unidentified source quoted in Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japa-
nese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951, University of Texas 
Press, Austin, 1979, p. 9. 
6 B.V.A. Röling, “Introduction”, in Chihiro Hosoya et al. (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial: An International Symposium, Kodansha International, New York, 1986, p. 16. 
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Another contributory factor was the Tokyo Tribunal’s perceived lack of 
‘international’ representation. Despite the participation of judges from 11 
countries, the IMTFE has long been perceived to be less ‘international’ 
than the IMT, whose judges and chief prosecutors came from four coun-
tries. To be sure, this view is hardly uniform. Some argue, for example, 
that the greater diversity of States participating in the Tokyo Tribunal en-
hanced its legitimacy.7 Yet for reasons elaborated in Section 5.3., many 
have seen the IMTFE as a fundamentally American enterprise. 
Crucially as well, concerns about the fairness and independence of 
the Tokyo Trial have coloured the way legal scholars construct its legacy.8 
This stands in marked contrast to how most international law experts have 
constructed the legacy of Nuremberg, which has been widely embraced as 
a “spectacular success”9 despite concerns that the IMT embodied victors’ 
justice and imposed retroactive punishment. 
Recent scholarship has questioned whether the Tokyo Tribunal’s 
acknowledged flaws were of a fundamentally different order than those 
long associated with Nuremberg, or at any rate were as extreme as has 
long been supposed.10 While that inquiry is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter, it is relevant here to note a third factor behind generally harsh assess-
ments of the IMTFE: vocal critics of the Tokyo Tribunal included key par-
ticipants in its proceedings. This phenomenon was famously exemplified 
in Judge Radhabinod Pal’s blistering dissent,11 but it was not just Pal who 
faulted core features of the IMTFE. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Henri 
Bernard averred: “A verdict reached by a Tribunal after a defective proce-
dure cannot be a valid one”.12 For many years, moreover, a scathing in-
 
7 See, for example, Pritchard, 1998, vol. 2, p. xxxi, see above note 1. 
8 See Futamura, 2008, p. 60, see above note 3; Lachezar D. Yanev, Theories of Co-
Perpetration in International Criminal Law, Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2018, pp. 109-15. 
9 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, p. 147. 
10 See, for example, Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the 
Wake of World War II, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 
11 Although Pal’s judgment was not read in court, it was reported in the Nippon Times along 
with other judgments; Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal: A Reappraisal, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 324 n. 183. 
12 Dissenting Judgment of the Member from France (Henri Bernard), Tokyo Trial Records, 
vol. 105, p. 20 (of Bernard’s judgment), see above note 1. 
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dictment of the Tribunal published in 1971 “seemed to define the field”.13 
Tellingly, its author acknowledged that his “major concern in writing [his] 
book” was “to demolish the credibility of the Tokyo trial and its ver-
dict”.14 
For decades, moreover, scholars who may have wished to explore 
the Tokyo proceedings faced practical challenges. While the Nuremberg 
judgment and proceedings were quickly published by the British and 
American governments, the Tokyo judgment and records were never offi-
cially published, and were available commercially only decades after the 
trial ended.15 
In the section that follows, I elaborate on two points noted above: 
the relatively scant attention paid by international legal scholars to the 
IMTFE derives, in significant part, from a longstanding perception that it 
was (1) derivative of Nuremberg, and yet (2) an essentially American in-
stitution rather than a truly international tribunal. 
5.3. An Echo of Nuremberg and an American Show 
5.3.1. Early Planning for Post-war Prosecutions 
Early planning for post-war prosecutions laid the seeds for perceptions of 
Tokyo as “an echo of […] Nuremberg”.16 Allied leaders’ early statements 
about wartime depredations warranting punishment focused overwhelm-
ingly on Nazi crimes, though some dealt with Japanese offences.17 The 
United Nations War Crimes Commission (‘UNWCC’), which was estab-
lished in October 1943, at first focused solely on Axis war crimes; in May 
1944, however, it established a sub-commission to address war crimes in 
Asia and the Pacific.18 Only in late August 1945 did the UNWCC publish 
 
13 Gerry Simpson, “Writing the Tokyo Trial”, in Yuki Tanaka, Tim McCormack, and Gerry 
Simpson (eds.), Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011, p. 29. 
14 Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1971, p. ix. 
15 Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 325, see above note 11. 
16 Piccigallo, 1979, p. 9, see above note 5. 
17 See Boister and Cryer, 2008, pp. 17-19, see above note 11; Solis Horwitz, “The Tokyo 
Trial”, in International Conciliation, 1950, vol. 28, pp. 477-79; Minear, 1971, p. 8, see 
above note 14. 
18 See Ustinia Dolgopol, “Knowledge and Responsibility: The Ongoing Consequences of 
Failing to Give Sufficient Attention to the Crimes Against The Comfort Women In The 
Tokyo Trial”, in Tanaka, McCormack, and Simpson, 2011, p. 249, see above note 13. 
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a white paper recommending that suspected Japanese war criminals be 
“surrendered to or apprehended by the United Nations for trial before an 
international military tribunal”.19 
Similarly, wartime warnings of post-war trials focused at first on 
Germany. Although a definitive plan to establish the IMT would come 
later, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union laid 
down a marker in November 1943, when the three countries’ leaders is-
sued the Moscow Declaration warning that Germans responsible for 
atrocities would face post-war punishment.20  Preparations for post-war 
prosecutions in Nuremberg were well underway by the time the three ma-
jor allies in the war with Japan – China, the United Kingdom and the 
United States – declared their general intentions concerning post-war 
prosecutions of Japanese. The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, later 
endorsed by the Soviet Union, stated that “stern justice shall be meted out 
to all [Japanese] war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties 
upon our prisoners”.21 
Inevitably, too, the legal framework for Nuremberg was adopted 
first, and provided a model for Tokyo – a key factor behind the previous-
ly-noted “and Tokyo” thread in legal scholarship. The US government did 
not begin drafting a Tokyo prosecution policy in earnest until 9 August 
1945,22 the day after the Nuremberg Charter was adopted. As a participant 
in the Tokyo proceedings recalled, those who drafted “the Tokyo Charter 
took full advantage of the work of their predecessors in London, and to 
avoid substantial differences in carrying out related programs, followed as 
closely as possible the Nuremberg Charter”.23 
 
19 Hisakazu Fujita, “The Tokyo Trial: Humanity’s Justice v Victors’ Justice?”, in Tanaka, 
McCormack, and Simpson, 2011, pp. 5-6, see ibid. (quoting UNWCC, Draft Summary of 
Recommendations concerning Japanese War Criminals and Atrocities). 
20 Moscow Declaration on Atrocities by President Roosevelt, Mr. Winston Churchill and 
Marshal Stalin, 1 November 1943 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3c6e23/). 
21 Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan, United States-China-United Kingdom, 
Potsdam, 26 July 1945, para. 10 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f8cae3/). 
22 See Totani, 2008, p. 21, see above note 10. 
23 Horwitz, 1950, p. 486, see above note 17. 
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5.3.2. American Leadership in London and Domination in Tokyo 
As is well known, the United States was the driving force behind the idea 
of prosecuting Nazi war criminals once the war ended.24 Early on, the 
United Kingdom favoured executing the principal Axis leaders; Stalin 
proposed shooting thousands.25 In this setting, the United States had to 
persuade its allies to accept its vision. 
The United States also took the lead in developing one of Nurem-
berg’s central innovations – criminalizing the planning, preparation, initia-
tion and waging of wars of aggression, which the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters termed “crimes against peace”. On this point, too, the United 
States had to persuade reluctant allies to go along. Doing so was a major 
focus of US diplomacy, under the leadership of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 
when the four Allied powers met in London to negotiate the Nuremberg 
Charter.26 Only after weeks of difficult negotiations was Jackson able to 
overcome the strenuous resistance of the French and Soviet delegates.27 
When participants in the London Conference adopted the Nuremberg 
Charter on 8 August 1945, they included this novel crime in the Tribunal’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction, along with conventional war crimes and an-
other legal innovation, crimes against humanity.28 
When applied to Nazi atrocities against German citizens, the last 
crime represented a profound rupture with bedrock principles of interna-
tional law, which had long deemed outside its regulatory remit the way a 
government treated its own citizens in its own territory. Partly for this rea-
son, the Nuremberg Charter specified that crimes against humanity could 
be prosecuted only when committed “in execution of or in connection 
 
24 See Diane Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2018, p. 432, n. 16. 
25 See Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1992, pp. 29-32; Bass, 2000, p. 147, see above note 9. Before he was 
persuaded to pursue post-war prosecutions, President Franklin Roosevelt too was sympa-
thetic to the idea of summarily executing Nazi leaders. See ibid. 
26 See Totani, 2008, p. 21, see above note 10. 
27 See ibid. 
28 Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the London Agreement of 8 Au-
gust 1945 for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, 8 August 1945, Article 6 (‘Nuremberg Charter’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
64ffdd/). 
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with” one of the other crimes set forth in the Charter,29 which by their na-
ture entailed inter-State armed conflict. 
The joint adoption of the Nuremberg Charter at the conclusion of 
multilateral negotiations and the adherence to that instrument by 19 other 
States, along with organizational matters that are discussed later, meant 
that Nuremberg would be widely seen and celebrated as a multilateral 
project despite its origins in American planning and its debt to American 
persistence. The process culminating in the promulgation of the Tokyo 
Charter was markedly different. 
The first draft of the Tokyo Charter “was drawn up, in its entirety, 
by the United States”.30 While this draft was amended to accommodate 
the views of US allies,31 
[i]t was made abundantly clear to the Allied Powers that the 
Supreme Commander [of occupied Japan, U.S. General 
Douglas MacArthur,] and the United States Government 
were determined to go ahead with the Tribunal on American 
terms. This train was going to depart whether or not the other 
United Nations chose to go along for the ride. The result was 
that the Allied Powers […] fell in step with General MacAr-
thur’s diktat […].32 
The United States did not share its key policy document for prose-
cutions in Japan with Allied governments until well into October 1945,33 
 
29 Ibid., Article 6(c) 
30 Horwitz, 1950, p. 483, see above note 17. 
31 The original Charter, promulgated on 19 January 1946, provided for the appointment of 
“not less than five nor more than nine Members”. Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East, Article 2, in General Orders No. I, General Headquarters Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, 19 January 1946. The Charter was amended to allow 
for up to eleven members so that India and the Philippines, which had not signed the in-
strument of surrender but had fought against Japan, could nominate judges and prosecutors. 
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Article 2, in General 
Orders No. 20, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 26 
April 1946; TIAS No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (‘Tokyo Charter’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/44f398/). 
32 Pritchard, 1998, vol. 2, p. xxvii, see above note 1. 
33 Totani, 2008, pp. 21, 26, see above note 10; Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 23, see above note 
11. According to Solis Horwitz, a US member of the prosecution staff, a directive ordering 
the investigation, apprehension and detention of suspected war criminals, which was is-
sued on 21 September 1945, was “approved by all nations taking part in the occupation of 
Japan”. Horwitz, 1950, p. 480, see above note 17. But Horwitz did not clearly state wheth-
er these countries approved of the directive before it was issued. 
 
The Tokyo Tribunal: Perspectives on Law, History and Memory 
Nuremberg Academy Series No. 3 (2020) – page 92 
weeks after Japan surrendered and General MacArthur had arrived in To-
kyo to take up his post as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in 
Japan. By that time, the arrests of suspected Japanese war criminals by 
Americans were well underway.34 And while the Nuremberg Charter was 
jointly promulgated by four countries, the Tokyo Charter was issued 
through the unilateral action of General MacArthur.35 
5.3.3. Legal Frameworks: Derivation and Difference 
Although strongly influenced by the IMT Charter, the text of the Tokyo 
Charter was by no means an exact replica. While the first point may have 
obscured Tokyo’s legal innovations, key differences detracted from the 
IMTFE’s legal legacy (though these were hardly the most important fac-
tors behind critical assessments of Tokyo). Even where the two charters 
were in sync, the taint of retroactive justice has clung more tenaciously to 
the Tokyo Tribunal than its counterpart in Nuremberg. 
The IMTFE’s debt to Nuremberg is particularly evident in Article 5 
of the Tokyo Charter, which sets forth the Tribunal’s subject-matter juris-
diction. Like the IMT, the Tokyo Tribunal had jurisdiction over crimes 
against peace, as well as participation in a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit them; conventional war crimes; and crimes against humanity. The 
Tokyo Charter’s definitions of these crimes largely followed, but were not 
identical to, those in the Nuremberg Charter. For example, instead of in-
cluding examples of war crimes, as the Nuremberg Charter had done, the 
Tokyo Charter more succinctly included the category of “Conventional 
War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war”.36 
 
34 See Brackman, 1987, p. 10, see above note 1. 
35 The Far Eastern Commission (‘FEC’), comprising representatives of ten countries that had 
fought against Japan, was empowered to take decisions that would be transmitted to Mac-
Arthur as directives. While its input resulted in amendments to the first version of the 
Charter promulgated by MacArthur, the FEC largely accepted the US policy on prosecu-
tions in Tokyo. Horwitz, 1950, pp. 481-82, see above note 17. 
36 Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 5(b), see above note 31. The corresponding provi-
sion in the Nuremberg Charter reads:  
WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for 
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devasta-
tion not justified by military necessity[.] 
 Nuremberg Charter, 8 August 1945, Article 6(b), see above note 28. 
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The Tokyo Charter’s definition of crimes against humanity diverges 
from its precursor more substantially. In the Nuremberg Charter, crimes 
against humanity were defined as certain inhumane acts “committed 
against any civilian population” when other conditions are present.37 Just 
days before the Tokyo Trial began, the phrase “against any civilian popu-
lation” was removed from the definition of crimes against humanity set 
forth in the original Charter proclaimed by General MacArthur. The 
amendment was suggested by Joseph Keenan, the American Chief Prose-
cutor in Tokyo, who wanted to establish that any killing – even of com-
batants – in the prosecution of a war of aggression is unlawful.38 The al-
tered definition left scant if any international legal legacy. No one was 
convicted of crimes against humanity in Tokyo,39 and the definition of this 
crime in the amended Tokyo Charter has not been followed in the statutes 
of other international criminal tribunals. 
Turning to crimes against peace, the definition in the Tokyo Charter 
largely tracked its precursor in the Nuremberg Charter, but added the text 
italicized below: 
Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of ag-
 
37 Ibid., Article 6(c), see above note 28. 
38 B.V.A. Röling and Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, Polity, Cambridge, 
1993, pp. 56-57. The prosecution did not rely solely on the charge of crimes against hu-
manity to advance this claim. Instead, it linked murder charges to all three crimes falling 
within the IMTFE’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The Majority Judgment side-stepped rul-
ing on this novel claim. For a detailed discussion of the murder counts, see Boister and 
Cryer, 2008, pp. 154-74, see above note 11. 
In another departure from the Nuremberg Charter, which defined “Crimes against Hu-
manity” to include “persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds”, Nuremberg 
Charter, 8 August 1945, Article 6(c), see above note 28, the corresponding phrase in the 
Tokyo Charter omitted the word “religious”, recognizing only “persecutions on political or 
racial grounds”. Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 5(c), see above note 31. In addition, 
the Tokyo Charter did not include any provision authorizing the Tokyo Tribunal to declare 
an organization or group a “criminal organization”, as the IMT was authorized to do. Nu-
remberg Charter, 8 August 1945, Article 9, see above note 28. 
39 The Tokyo indictment grouped war crimes and crimes against humanity together under the 
heading “Group Three: Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity”. The 
three counts listed under this heading emphasized violations of the laws of war, as did the 
further specifications of these violations in Appendix D. The Judgment dealt with atrocity 
crimes solely under the rubric of violations of the laws of war, presumably because the 
prosecutors who took the lead on the atrocities charges did not develop clear arguments 
about crimes against humanity. See Yuma Totani, “The Case against the Accused”, in 
Tanaka, McCormack and Simpson, 2011, p. 154, above note 13. 
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gression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the forego-
ing[.]40 
In a further departure from Nuremberg, the Tokyo Charter allowed for the 
prosecution of individuals only when they were “charged with offenses 
which include Crimes against Peace”.41 This limitation reflected the US 
government’s position, set forth in its previously-noted policy paper, that 
the investigative body in Tokyo “should attach importance” to crimes 
against peace.42 In fact, the United States apparently proposed that the 
IMTFE have jurisdiction only over crimes against peace, but agreed to 
include the other two crimes in the Tribunal’s remit at the insistence of the 
United Kingdom.43 
Despite this accommodation, at one point in the trial Keenan pro-
posed to shorten or even drop the prosecution’s presentation of war crimes 
evidence, which would leave the Tribunal to rule only on evidence relat-
ing to crimes against peace. Keenan’s suggestion drew strong objections 
from other Allied prosecutors, who prevailed.44 This, Yuma Totani writes, 
enabled “voluminous” evidence of Japanese atrocities to become part of 
the Tokyo Trial and historical record.45 
As to organizational matters, key differences between the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo Charters underscored American dominance in Tokyo 
(though, as already suggested, participants from other countries signifi-
cantly influenced the conduct and legacy of the trial). The Nuremberg 
 
40 Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 5(a), see above note 31. Totani suggests that the 
words “declared or undeclared” were introduced to clarify the irrelevance of a formal dec-
laration in light of the fact that Japan had initiated some armed attacks without prior warn-
ing or formal declaration: Totani, 2008, p. 81, see above note 10; Boister and Cryer em-
phasize the inverse: introducing the phrase clarified “that compliance with the formal re-
quirements for the declaration of war in international law did not deprive a war of its crim-
inal nature if it was aggressive”: Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 120, see above note 11. The 
separate addition of “law” after “international” sought to avoid any ambiguity regarding 
whether international law criminalized aggressive war: Totani, 2008, p. 81, see above note 
10. In Totani’s view, this position “had been the view of the planners of the Nuremberg 
tribunal, but it did not attain its full expression in the Nuremberg Charter”. Ibid. 
41 Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 5, see above note 31. 
42 Totani, 2011, p. 148, see above note 39. 
43 Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 25, see above note 11. 
44 Totani, 2011, p. 153, see above note 39. 
45 Ibid. 
5. The Tokyo Tribunal’s Legal Origins and Contributions to 
International Jurisprudence as Illustrated by Its Treatment of Sexual Violence 
Nuremberg Academy Series No. 3 (2020) – page 95 
Charter accorded each of the four signatories the right to appoint one 
judge and one alternate.46 In contrast, the Tokyo Charter vested General 
MacArthur with exclusive authority to appoint the Tribunal’s judges—
albeit, and by no means incidentally, from those whose names were sub-
mitted by the nine signatories to the Instrument of Surrender as well as 
India and the Philippines.47 And where the Nuremberg Charter provided 
for the four judges to select their own President,48 the Tokyo Charter pro-
vided for the Supreme Commander to appoint the President of the IMT-
FE.49 
In reality, MacArthur exercised less authority over the Tokyo Tribu-
nal than he seemed to possess in its Charter. As Totani notes, MacArthur 
did not really have the option of rejecting participating countries’ judicial 
nominees.50 That he hardly controlled the Tribunal is, moreover, amply 
demonstrated by the splintered opinions of its judges, including Judge 
Pal’s comprehensive dissent.51 Nevertheless, the concentration of authori-
ty in MacArthur is fundamental to perceptions of Tokyo as an American 
tribunal, as well as to concerns about its independence. 
Just as the IMT Charter accorded each signatory the right to appoint 
a judge and an alternate, it also gave each the right to appoint a Chief 
Prosecutor.52 In contrast to the equal status of Nuremberg’s four Chief 
Prosecutors, the Tokyo Charter provided for the Supreme Commander to 
 
46 Nuremberg Charter, 8 August 1945, Article 2, see above note 28. 
47 Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 2, see above note 31. 
48 Nuremberg Charter, 8 August 1945, Article 4(b), see above note 28. 
49 Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 3(a), see above note 31. In addition, while Article 
29 of the Nuremberg Charter vested responsibility for carrying out and potentially reduc-
ing sentences in the Control Council for Germany, which comprised the same four States 
that created the Tribunal, Article 17 of the Tokyo Charter vested this authority in the Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. As a result of a policy directive adopt-
ed by the FEC, however, MacArthur could exercise these powers only after consulting 
with representatives of the members of the FEC in Japan. See Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 
26, see above note 11; Horwitz, 1950, p. 482, see above note 17. 
50 Totani, 2008, p. 30, see above note 10. 
51 Two members of the Tribunal, the Australian President and the Filipino judge, submitted 
separate opinions that registered disagreement with aspects of the majority judgment. The 
French, Dutch and Indian members filed opinions that dissented from the majority judg-
ment more substantially – in the case of Judge Pal, comprehensively. For a succinct sum-
mary of the separate opinions, see Piccigallo, 1979, pp. 28-31, see above note 5. 
52 Nuremberg Charter, 8 August 1945, Article 14, see above note 28. 
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designate a single Chief of Counsel,53 whom other participating countries 
could appoint an “Associate Counsel to assist”. 54  This, Solis Horwitz 
wrote, was notable: “For the first time eleven nations had agreed in a mat-
ter other than actual military operations to subordinate their sovereignty 
and to permit a national of one of them to have final direction and con-
trol”.55 As already noted, an American, Joseph Berry Keenan, was ap-
pointed Chief of Counsel. 
In myriad ways that transcend Keenan’s formal position, the imprint 
of American policy on key prosecutorial decisions shaped enduring as-
sessments of the IMTFE. In particular, the Tokyo Tribunal’s legacy has 
long been clouded by American insistence that Emperor Hirohito not be 
indicted, as well as the United States’ role in suppressing evidence of hu-
man experimentation involving biological warfare by the Imperial Japa-
nese Army’s Manchuria-based Unit 731.56 
5.4. Reconsidering Tokyo’s Legal Legacy 
As we have seen, the convergence of myriad factors served to radically 
diminish the Tokyo Tribunal’s presence, and certainly its stature, in schol-
arly narratives about the origins of international criminal law. Remarkably, 
it was long common even among leading experts in the field of interna-
tional criminal law to describe the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), which was created by the UN Security 
Council in May 1993,57 as the first international criminal tribunal since 
Nuremberg.58 
Not surprisingly, then, scholars and advocates have often seemed 
unaware of the Tokyo Tribunal’s substantive contributions to the field of 
international criminal law.59 Apparent ignorance of the Tribunal’s treat-
ment of crimes of sexual violence is a notable case in point. 
 
53 Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946, Article 8(a), see above note 31. 
54 Ibid., Article 8(b). 
55 Horwitz, 1950, pp. 486-87, see above note 17. 
56 See Futamura, 2008, p. 63, see above note 3. 
57 UN Security Council, resolution 827, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY), UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/dc079b/). 
58 See Kaufman, 2010, pp. 753-54, see above note 4. 
59 Another factor may have contributed to this phenomenon: until the 1990s, literature ex-
ploring the Tokyo precedent focused overwhelmingly on crimes against peace, largely ob-
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With justification, scholars and advocates have often held that, until 
the 1990s, sexual violence was widely viewed as an inevitable by-product 
of war rather than a grave offense, and for that reason was largely invisi-
ble in post-war prosecutions.60 When the UN Security Council created the 
ICTY, a global movement sought to ensure that rape would at long last be 
prosecuted as a war crime, as though this had never happened before.61 
While advocates’ general concerns were amply warranted, many 
seemed unaware that crimes of sexual violence had been successfully 
prosecuted at Tokyo as war crimes. As previously noted, the prosecution 
offered “voluminous” evidence of Japanese atrocities, which included the 
rapes of thousands of women during the occupation of Nanjing in 1937–
38. The prosecution presented evidence of sexual violence principally as 
alleged violations of the laws of war as defined in the Regulations an-
nexed to the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land.62 
Notably in light of concerns that post-war prosecutions did not rec-
ognize the serious nature of sexual violence, testimony about rapes com-
mitted in Nanjing reflected an acute awareness of the gravity of these 
crimes. For example, a witness who described summary executions in 
Nanjing responded this way when asked, “What was the conduct of the 
Japanese soldiers toward the women” there?: “That was one of the rough-
est and saddest parts of the whole picture”.63 And when a defence lawyer 
tried to discredit a witness who testified about mass rapes in Nanjing by 
suggesting that Chinese soldiers also committed rape, the President of the 
 
scuring the Tribunal’s treatment of other atrocity crimes. See Totani, 2011, p. 147, see 
above note 39. This is not surprising, as charges relating to crimes against peace dominat-
ed the trial and judgment. See ibid.; Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 175, see above note 11. 
60 See, for example, Rhonda Copelon, “Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes 
against Women into International Criminal Law”, in McGill Law Journal, 2000, vol. 46, p. 
220. 
61 See Felice D. Gaer, “Rape as a Form of Torture: The Experience of the Committee Against 
Torture”, in CUNY Law Review, 2012, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 295. Some, to be sure, recognized 
the Tokyo precedent. See, for example, Theodor Meron, “Editorial Comment: Rape as a 
Crime under International Humanitarian Law”, in American Journal of International Law, 
1993, vol. 87, no. 3, p. 426. 
62 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regula-
tions concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 19 October 1907 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/fa0161/). 
63 Tokyo Trial Records, vol. 7, p. 2633, see above note 1 (testimony of Dr. Miner Searle 
Bates). 
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Tokyo Tribunal, Australian Justice William Webb, sternly reminded the 
lawyer “that rape and the murder of women could never be just repris-
als”.64 
The judgment did not provide a detailed assessment of evidence of 
sexual violence and other Japanese atrocities, which the majority deemed 
“not practicable”.65 Nevertheless, its brief review credited evidence con-
cerning rapes in Nanjing and other locations.66 Of atrocities in Nanjing, 
the judgment found: 
There were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penal-
ty for the slightest resistance on the part of a victim or the 
members of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls 
of tender years and old women were raped in large numbers 
throughout the city […]. Approximately 20,000 cases of rape 
occurred within the city during the first month of the occupa-
tion.67 
Although the judgment did not make determinations about the spe-
cific classification of these offences,68 it left no doubt that they constituted 
 
64 Ibid., p. 2595. 
65 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, 4 November 1948, in Tokyo 
Trial Records, vol. 103, p. 49592, see above note 1 (‘Judgment’). 
66 See, for example, ibid., pp. 49613 (Hopeh Province), 49617 (Changsha and Kweilin), 
49632 (Blora, Dutch East Indies), and 49638, 49640 (Manila). 
67 Ibid., pp. 49605-06. 
68 The prosecution brought several different war crimes charges in relation to crimes of sexu-
al violence. See example, Indictment, Annex D, Section One (“female prisoners were 
raped by members of the Japanese forces” in violation of Article 4 of the Hague Regula-
tions prohibiting “inhumane treatment”); ibid., Section Twelve (inhabitants of occupied 
territories were raped in violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations requiring respect 
for “[f]amily honour and rights”). 
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war crimes.69 Certain defendants were, moreover, convicted for failing to 
take appropriate measures to stop these and other atrocities.70 
This is not to suggest Tokyo modeled appropriate treatment of 
crimes of sexual violence. Far from it. In particular, the prosecution and 
judgment have been faulted, and quite rightly so, for their almost com-
plete neglect of the sexual enslavement of so-called “comfort women”.71 
Shamefully, this failure was not for lack of evidence, which was readily 
available. Indeed, evidence of enforced prostitution was introduced during 
the Tokyo Trial, and the judgment explicitly recognized that, during the 
Japanese occupation of Kweilin [Guilin], Japanese forces “recruited 
women labor on the pretext of establishing factories” yet in reality “forced 
the women thus recruited into prostitution with Japanese troops”.72 Even 
so, as Ustinia Dolgopol writes, “these crimes were never made a central 
focus of the prosecutors’ case nor of the Judgment”.73 
Yet this should not obscure the unique contributions of the Tokyo 
Tribunal. The Tokyo prosecutor’s decision to include acts of sexual vio-
 
69 See, for example, Judgment, Tokyo Trial Records, vol. 103, p. 49592, see above note 1, 
stating:  
The evidence relating to atrocities and other Conventional War Crimes presented be-
fore the Tribunal establishes that from the opening of the war in China until the sur-
render of Japan in August 1945 torture, murder, rape and other cruelties of the most 
inhumane and barbarous character were freely practiced by the Japanese Army and 
Navy.  
 (Emphasis added.) See also ibid., p. 49791 (finding defendant guilty of war crimes in rela-
tion to “violations of women” and other atrocities in Nanjing). 
70 See ibid., pp. 49815-16 (General Iwane Matsui, Commander-in-Chief of the Central China 
Area Army, knew of the atrocities, including rape, committed in Nanjing, and “had the 
power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of 
Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty”); 
ibid., p. 49791 (Kōki Hirota, Japan’s Foreign Minister, “was derelict in his duty in not in-
sisting before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, 
failing any other action open to him to bring about the same result. He was content to rely 
on assurances which he knew were not being implemented while hundreds of murders, vi-
olations of women, and other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction amount-
ed to criminal negligence”). While my focus here is on the fact that suspects were convict-
ed of war crimes including rape, it should be noted that the standard of superior responsi-
bility imposed by the IMTFE has been controversial. 
71 See, for example, Nicola Henry, “Silence as Collective Memory: Sexual Violence and the 
Tokyo Tribunal”, in Tanaka, McCormack and Simpson, 2011, p. 263, above note 13. 
72 Judgment, Tokyo Trial Records, vol. 103, p. 49617, see above note 1. 
73 Dolgopol, 2011, p. 244, see above note 18. 
 
The Tokyo Tribunal: Perspectives on Law, History and Memory 
Nuremberg Academy Series No. 3 (2020) – page 100 
lence in war crimes charges and the judgment’s recognition of rape as a 
war crime marked a salutary departure from Nuremberg. Despite exten-
sive documentation of Nazi crimes of sexual violence and the introduction 
of evidence of such crimes during the IMT trial, they were not prosecuted 
as such in Nuremberg.74 Viewed in this light, the IMTFE’s prosecution of 
sexual violence as a war crime is historic. 
Thus it is striking that, even today, analyses of international juris-
prudence on crimes of sexual violence often cite the Tokyo precedent, if at 
all, for the proposition that its Charter did not explicitly recognize rape as 
a war crime or crime against humanity.75 
Fortunately, the first Prosecutor of the ICTY and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Richard J. Goldstone, never doubted that 
rape constitutes a war crime provided other elements of war crimes are 
present. Nevertheless, he and his fledgling staff wanted to marshal the 
strongest support available for the charges they would bring. During the 
early years of the ad hoc Tribunals’ operations, I directed a project, the 
War Crimes Research Office of the Washington College of Law, that pro-
vided legal analyses to the Prosecutor. Among the earliest requests we re-
ceived was for an analysis of post-war precedents for prosecuting crimes 
of sexual violence. One of our most extensive memoranda for the Prose-
cutor explored the Tokyo Tribunal’s historic judgment, then the most im-
portant precedent in this area.76 
 
74 See Kelly D. Askin, “Women and International Humanitarian Law”, in Kelly D. Askin and 
Dorean M. Koenig (eds.), Women and International Human Rights Law, Transnational 
Publishers, Ardsley, 1999, vol. 1, p. 52; Patricia Viseur Sellers, “The Prosecution of Sexual 
Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as a Means of Interpretation”, 
2008, p. 7 (available on the UN’s web site); Kelly D. Askin, “Prosecuting Wartime Rape 
and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, En-
during Obstacles”, in Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2003, vol. 21, p. 301. Never-
theless, gender-related crimes for which evidence was introduced in Nuremberg “can be 
considered subsumed within the IMT Judgment”, ibid. 
75 See, for example, Grace Harbour, “International Concern Regarding Conflict-related Sex-
ual Violence in the Lead-up to the ICTY’s Establishment”, in Serge Brammertz and 
Michelle Jarvis (eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, p. 28. 
76 In contrast to many scholars’ failure to recognize Tokyo’s treatment of sexual violence, the 
person who served as Goldstone’s specialist on gender-based crimes, Patricia Viseur 
Sellers, has forthrightly recognized the Tokyo Tribunal’s singular legacy. Noting criticism 
of the IMT for its failure to address sexual violence, Sellers continues: “The Tokyo Tribu-
nal prosecutors […] resolutely indicted the rape of prisoners and female nurses”, while its 
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5.5. Conclusion 
For a variety of reasons, including undeniably serious flaws, the Tokyo 
Tribunal was long neglected or downplayed in legal scholarship, as in 
other disciplines. As a consequence, its foundational role in and contribu-
tions to international criminal law were long obscured. Scholarship in this 
field was correspondingly diminished, as many scholars and practitioners 
overlooked opportunities to build upon salutary aspects of the IMTFE’s 
work. 
Fortunately, recent years have brought welcome change, as a wealth 
of impressive scholarship has revisited virtually every aspect of the Tri-
bunal’s legacy. Other authors in this volume are among the leading con-
tributors to this rich body of work. Through their work, Tokyo’s legacy is 
being reconstructed in all its rich complexity. And this is invaluable. For a 
tribunal’s record – its failures as well as its successes – can offer vital les-
sons and resources for contemporary efforts to sanction crimes against the 
basic code of humanity. 
 
judges, “upon denoting the plethora of extreme sexual misconduct, forthrightly issued 
convictions”: Sellers, 2008, p. 7, see above note 74. 
